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1 Interdisciplinarity plays a major role in the multifaceted thought of John Dewey. His
theoretical  interests  cross  the  traditional  academic  boundaries  in  the  name  of
improved  research  and  teaching,  and  his  works  could  be  seen  cumulatively  as  a
systematic  approach  consisting  of  different  interdisciplinary  perspectives  each
intertwined with the next. On this issue, the essays gathered in Il pensiero di John Dewey
tra psicologia, filosofia, pedagogia. Prospettive interdisciplinari, edited by Elisa Frauenfelder,
Maura Striano, and Stefano Oliverio, importantly contribute to sharpening the precise
role interdisciplinarity plays in Dewey’s work. The anthology, which has its roots in a
series of seminars held at the University of Naples Federico II  between January and
June 2009, that is, the 150th anniversary of Dewey’s birth, brings into focus Dewey’s
thought from different perspectives. In particular, through a broad discussion of the
function that psychology, philosophy, and pedagogy have had as heuristic hinges in
Dewey’s  speculation  from early  to  late  works,  the  book seeks  to  develop a  fruitful
reflection aiming at inquiring after the potentiality of crossing the traditional academic
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boundaries  of  epistemological  research  which  in  our  time  face  complex  and
problematic social, political, and educational situations.
2 As the editors argue in the introduction, Dewey saw himself at the intersection between
modernity  and  post-modernity,  in  so  far  as  the  American  thinker  felt  the  need  to
overcome both the ostensible cultural divisions and the separation between practical
and  theoretical  reason  (p. viii).  From  this  perspective,  the  wealth  of  Dewey’s
interdisciplinary approach seems to be due to the fact that his philosophy evades the
epistemic errors of modernity, assuming, on the contrary, the role of “link-discipline”
between different areas of knowledge as a general theory of education (ix). Dewey has, in
fact,  always  been  related  to  the  ideal  of  democratization  of  knowledge  and  has
considered the school as the main condition of growth of democratic ideals. His main
purpose was to switch from reason to reasonableness, the last being a form of practical
reason linking the transforming values of poiesis with the central role of praxis. From an
interdisciplinary  perspective,  psychology  was  seen  by  philosophy  as  a  theoretical
source equipped with both content and method, and philosophy, for its part, was seen
as  the  highest  form  of  human  self-comprehension.  As  Striano  argues  in  her
contribution  to  the  volume,  interdisciplinarity  for  Dewey  is  fundamental  to  the
realization of an inquiry into the various fields of human experience, focusing upon the
possible  heuristic  uses  of  knowledge as  a  way of  exploring reality  (64).  Hence,  this
perspective  involves  the  essential  connection  between  philosophy,  psychology,  and
education in  an  epistemological  framework in  which each discipline  contributes  to
knowing the complex texture of events, facts, situations which form the universe.
3 The volume is composed of four sections which gather contributions of scholars from
different  fields  of  interest.  The  essays  of  the  first  and  fourth  sections  offer  the
theoretical  framework  for  the  reflections  in  the  second  and  third  sections,  which
address the actuality of  Dewey’s  philosophy and psychology.  In what follows,  I  will
present several contributions I consider to be exemplary of each part of the volume
regarding the different aspects of Dewey’s interdisciplinary thought, sketching some
brief considerations about a couple of contributions, the first of which is J. Garrison’s
L’indagine interdisciplinare di Dewey: superare le scissioni della modernità e gli eccessi della
modernità.  In this essay, Dewey’s theories of mind and education are compared with
modernism and the post-modernist approach to reality, as well as possible forms of
relationship with contemporary theories of mind. Garrison’s contribution is dedicated
to pointing out  both Dewey’s  overcoming the mistakes  of  modernity  as  well  as  his
preventing  slippages  into  the  excesses  of  post-modernity.  According  to  Garrison,
Dewey showed us the way to overcome both the barrier to interdisciplinary discourse
inherent in Kant’s formal divisions of culture, and the barrier between practical and
theoretical  reason:  “which  often  leaves  those  in  professional  schools  such  as  law,
engineering, education, and medicine out of the conversation” (14). As Dewey teaches
us,  rather  than compartmentalizing value spheres,  we need to  realize  that  science,
ethics,  and aesthetics  inter-penetrate  each other.  We can then distinguish between
immediate goods and genuine goods by using the mediating tools of inquiry, and, most
important: 
[…] we must recognize the role of existential doing and making in all three value
spheres, which allows us to avoid Kant’s hypostatization of the true, the good, and
the beautiful. (15)
4 As Garrison puts it, Dewey’s insistence about the entanglement between ethics, science,
and aesthetics intermingle expresses his rejection of the canonical interpretation of
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modernity. He did not seek consolation in transcendental ideals. On the contrary, he
seeks to recover philosophy for everyday functions, aiming to overcome the loss of
intercommunication  and  mutual  criticism between  separated  domains  of  inquiry.
However,  whilst  Dewey believed that  philosophy,  like  literature,  “is  a  comment  on
nature and life in the interest of a more intense and just appreciation of the meanings
present in experience” (LW 1: 304), he was not a precursor of post-modernism. Dewey
preserves  the  distinction  between  science  and  literature  while  showing  why
interdisciplinary studies  are  necessary.  He considers  universals  as  logical  falsifiable
tools  defining operations for  the construction of  something.  On the contrary,  post-
modernists such as Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, and Michel
Foucault, according to Garrison: “are nominalists about universals. That makes it easy
for them to think that everything is simply a text and that there is nothing outside of
texts” (19-20). Actually, I have to confess that it is not clear to me how correct it is to
define  almost  all  these  thinkers  as  nominalists  in  such  a  negative  way.  Lyotard’s
interest in Kant’s analytic of the sublime, Rorty’s constructionist reflections against any
sort  of  logical  ‘rigidity’  and  his  reference  to  language  as  behaviour,  and  Michel
Foucault’s  search  for  an  ‘archeology’  of  cultures  show,  in  my  opinion,  that  their
‘nominalisms’  were  consonant  with  Dewey’s  seeking  to  overcome  an  over-
specialization  of  field  researches,  in  order  to  combat  the  risk  of  sacrificing
intercommunication and mutual criticism between separated domains of inquiry. From
such a perspective,  according to Rorty,  Lyotard,  Foucault,  Derrida,  their differences
notwithstanding, literature, poetry and aesthetic experiences have to be considered as
tools  which  help  us  to  grasp  the  significance  of  the  many  vectors  within  rapidly
changing situations. 
5 In the contribution that follows Garrison’s essay,  Larry Hickman highlights Dewey’s
interdisciplinary perspective on pedagogy as rejecting the idea that experience exhibits
any sorts of structural gaps that are fixed and final, emphasizing, on the contrary, the
continuities in the constructions of things and the restoration of continuities as one of
the most important functions of education. He writes: 
Things come to us in pieces, and even once constructed they tend to fall apart as a
result  of  the  incessant  pressures  of  time  and  circumstance.  Continual  analysis,
reconstruction, and renewal of continuities is,  in Dewey’s view, one of the most
important functions of education. (24-5)
6 In particular, in his deep analysis of Dewey’s pedagogy, Hickman brings to light the
‘discipline’  at  the  core  of  Dewey’s  theory  of  education,  stressing  on  the  one  hand
Dewey’s critique of rigid disciplinary rules and the specialization of curriculum that
characterized the traditional American school; on the other hand highlighting Dewey’s
emphasis upon the difference between what he distinguishes as ‘study’ and ‘studying’,
the first consisting in “a definitely aggregated body of subject matter isolated from
others and treated as a unit by itself”, the latter being “interdisciplinary by definition”,
consisting in: “many things not contained in the narrow precincts of the textbooks”
(LW 6: 79). Studying, or, the act of studying, was for Dewey not a luxury, but a social
necessity. The curriculum of the University of Chicago Lab school was hence designed
to be instrumental to real learning. As Hickman argues, Dewey’s pedagogy served “as a
tool to introduce the students to analyses of the processes by means of which they were
learning to learn” (29). In this pedagogical context, philosophy must assume the most
important role; it: “must speak the language of many disciplines, interacting with them
both horizontally and vertically, as it were” (31).
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7 Giuliano  Minichiello  presents  some  interesting  insights  on  the  possible  form  of
relationship between the vast field of the philosophies of mind and Dewey’s approach
to a general theory of thought. More precisely, Minichiello characterizes the Deweyan
position  as  having  two  aspects,  that  is,  the  ‘mind’  considered  as  process,  and  the
concept of ‘transaction’ which clarify the concept of experience in indicating a holistic
context  within which:  “knowledge,  inquiry,  and the mind itself  are  not  reduced to
‘parts’, to mechanisms that are dots on an unspecified whole” (35-6). Then, appealing to
Dewey’s  concept  of  ‘transaction’,  Minichiello  distinguishes  in  Dewey’s  theory  of
thought three stages that are strictly intertwined: the experienced stage, corresponding
to a set of processes that create meanings and norms in a random universe; the thought
stage to which correspond processes of transaction and stabilization of symbols, and
the linguistic stage, which corresponds to the established structures of symbols, culture,
and values. This linguistic level blends itself into the experienced level: “consciousness
is the critical emergence in evolution and from it descend reflective thought in a strict
sense  and  ethics”  (39).  According  to  Minichiello,  Dewey’s  preference  for  the
transactional  perspective,  that  he  preferred  after  a  first  use  of  the  concept  of
‘interaction’,  is  the element that distinguishes his theory of thought from the most
mature mentalistic perspective, namely, the enactive model. His non-reductivist theory
of mind considers ‘reflexive thinking’ as: 
[…]  an  explanation  of  ontological  conditions  as  constructions  included  in  the
process  of  inquiry  useful  in  translating  the  obstacles  that  it  meets  into
configurations that are accessible to a rational analysis. (40)
8 A  further  in-depth  analysis  of  Dewey’s  preference  for  transaction  perspective  is
traceable  in  Svend  Brinkmann’s  contribution  to  the  second  section  of  the  volume
dedicated  to  Dewey’s  works on  psychology.  Brinkmann,  in  fact,  addresses  his
contribution to the transactional approach of Dewey’s psychology, which the author
defined as  his  ‘neglected psychology’.  As  he argues,  in  Experience  and Nature Dewey
referred to his own position as empirical naturalism in the sense that the: “living subject
is in and of nature, and everything experienced is equally part of reality” (126). Through
a presentation of  the overarching Deweyan framework as one of  transactions, and a
discussion  of  Dewey’s  meta-psychology,  namely,  the  practices  of  psychology  as
historically  and  socially  situated,  Brinkmann  presents  a  synthesizing  view  of  key
psychological themes from Dewey’s writings, advancing the suggestion that: 
[…] although the transactional perspective was introduced in name only late in his
career, it was always an implicit part of his psychology that we have much to learn
from today”. (126)
9 After all, Dewey’s contributions to psychology were not secondary to his contributions
to philosophy and pedagogy. It is true, however, as David Patton Barone argues in his
paper that follows Brinkmann’s, that Dewey’s direct involvement in psychology was
briefer  and  mainly  devoted  to  providing  him  “a  means  of  making  philosophy  less
remote and of inquiring into concrete human experience” (89).
10 The third is the main section of the volume, and it addresses Dewey’s philosophy. It is
composed of two main contributions, those of Stefan Neubert and Ramón del Castillo
Santos,  and  four  replies.  In  his  contribution,  Neubert  compares  Dewey’s  pluralistic
approach  with  constructivist  perspectives  and,  focusing  upon  the  defence  of
constructivism in philosophy,  Neubert considers Dewey’s  pragmatism well  suited to
defend constructivism. The main reason for that claim is that, according to Neubert,
Dewey’s works present some sort of ambiguity that, if correctly interpreted, would be
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useful  to  interactive  constructivism.  This  is  because  pluralism  seems  to  be  deeply
rooted in Dewey’s  conception of  experience,  permeating its  whole  philosophy from
epistemology to politics  and education.  However,  according to Neubert,  in order to
evaluate  Dewey’s  pluralism,  it is  necessary  to  avoid  all  references  to  linguistic
expressions  such  as  ‘social  engineering’  or  ‘social  mechanism’,  which  call  upon
metaphors  which  tend  to  obfuscate  his  thought.  Once  again,  the  concept  of
‘transaction’  is  here  recovered,  and it  aims to  highlight  the social  ‘co-constructive’
origin of methods and cultural identities. 
11 In his comment on Neubert’s contribution, Roberto Frega argues that, in giving voice to
a constructivist epistemology of practice – that of the Köln constructivism – Neubert
offers too much relativistic interpretation of Dewey’s thought, referring to the meaning
of social progress and its possible link to scientific methods. On the contrary, according
to  Frega,  more  compatible  with  Deweyan  pragmatism  is  a  social  constructivism
conceived according to a modest form of pluralism – as opposed to a radical account of
it.  In  this  perspective  Dewey’s  epistemology  seems  more  compatible  with  a  mild
relativism which requires a realism (see his papers on naïve vs. presentative realism)
which binds our discursive practices and limits them.
12 Giovanni Maddalena’s reply to Neubert also challenges the Rortyan interpretation of
Dewey as chevalier of democratic pluralism, arguing that,  “if  we really want to use
Dewey  as  a  defender  of  pluralism,  we  better  have  to  look  at  his  logic  and  at  his
metaphysics” (211), according to which ‘reality’ is independent of what any number of
people think about it. However, this does not mean independent of any thought, but
independent of subjectivistic perspectives (207). Particularly interesting is Maddalena’s
highlighting of  Dewey’s  attempt  to  avoid  nominalism pragmatically  intended as  an
unsound gap between the real object and mind as the most inspiring part of Dewey’s
insight in view of a pluralistic society.  Against Neubart’s interpretation of Deweyan
experimentalism as  construction,  deconstruction,  and continual  reconstruction of  a
diversity of flexible methods for resolving diverse and changing problems, Maddalena
argues  that  Dewey’s  experimentalism  “is  just  the  last  part  of  a  more  complicated
account of experience” (208).
13 The  second  contribution  of  the  section  on  philosophy  is  Ramón  del  Castillo’s  Una
grammatica  dell’esperienza.  John  Dewey  e  le  lotte  culturali. Through  a  deep  and  well-
documented analysis of the difference between Habermas’ and Dewey’s approaches to
the  issue  of  the  democratic  value  of  communicative  practices,  and  their  differing
accounts of the normative level of social and political practices, del Castillo advances
the thesis that Dewey contributed to our understanding of how experience could still
be used to reconstruct a political grammar. In particular, del Castillo points out that, in
the  contest  of  the  debate  between  communitarians  and  liberals  around  the  role
‘experience’ plays in public political debates, Dewey’s ideas reappear as an opportunity
to reahabilitate the notion of experience, but also “a chance to set out a different idea of
reason”  (214).  And  this  is  because  articulated  social  interactions  as  expressions  of
political thought, are grounded, for Dewey, in a moral psychology and a description of
pre-political commitments that precede communicative rationality. Social experiences
lie  beyond the  act  of  adopting  a  communicative  stance  and  imply  a  “mutual
engagement within a situation whose features require much more than a cognitive
interest to be handled” (239). Against an interpretation of Dewey as instrumentalist, del
Castillo argues that he was also a philosopher who grounded human action in the world
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of  human experience,  reinterpreting  the  interplay  between reason and experience,
mediation  and  immediacy,  and  that  grounded  democratic  procedures  on  habits,
customs, tradition, and experiences as contingent structures of moral concern. In her
comment  on  del  Castillo’s  paper,  Rosa  Calcaterra  focuses  upon  the  notion  of
‘experience’, pointing out Dewey’s emphasis upon the foundational role of ‘essential
traits’ of human experience as the proper ground of the positive relationship between
cultural politics and political culture that Dewey tried to support. Calling attention to
Dewey’s  distinction  between  ‘experience  had’  and  ‘experience  known’,  Calcaterra
claims  the  need  for  rethinking  at  the  political  and  social  level  of  Dewey’s  overall
approach of the concept of ‘experience known’ in light of the problem, which is an
integral part of contemporary multicultural societies, of a democratic management of
different religious beliefs and practical attitudes.
14 What  is  also  of  particular  interest  in  del  Castillo’s  paper  is  his  interpretation  of
Habermas.  Contrasting those critics  of  Habermas’  excessive rationalism,  del  Castillo
points to the image of Habermas as someone who never denied that communicative
rationality  depends  upon  cultural  pre-communicative  resources.  According  to him,
Habermas seems to have a more naturalistic approach to legitimating the normative
pattern of socialization that renders communicative action implicitly valid for every
member  of  society,  and that  communication is  displayed in  moral  practices  as  the
highest state of the evolution of moral development in modern societies. However, del
Castillo admits that this does not mean that Habermas has become more and more
‘Deweyan’, for he continues to sustain the priority of linguistic communication in the
process of socialization. As he argues, Habermas’ ‘pseudo-naturalistic’ turn is not part
of  a  really  Deweyan  and  Hegelian  switch.  I  sympathize  with  del  Castillo’s  lecture.
However  I  think  also  that  a  better  understanding  of  what  he  calls  the  Habermas’
pseudo-naturalistic turn would be possible by paying more attention to the influence
Mead’s theory of gestural communication has had upon his theory of communication
(as well as it has had upon Dewey’s theory of human nature and conduct). In particular,
the reference to Mead’s theory of the progression from gestural to symbolic language
as the product of a bio-social process would shed new light upon Habermas’ perspective
on pre-linguistic communication. This would, in my opinion, offer also an element that
would cast new light upon the comparison between Dewey’s and Habermas’ approaches
to communication.
15 The fourth and last section of the volume addresses to Dewey’s pedagogical thought
and it begins with Franco Cambi’s rethinking of Dewey’s pedagogical thought as the
organic  synthesis  of  modern  and  post-modern  Western  thought.  Particularly
praiseworthy  is  Stefano  Oliverio’s  Democratic  Community  of  Inquiry  vs  Bund: Dewey,
German  Sociology,  and  the  Americanization  of  the  Soul,  in  which  the  author  compares
Dewey’s  new  individualism  and  his  idea  of  community  of  inquiry  with  German
Radikalismus, which yearned for community (Gemeinschaft) and rejected scientific and
technological  modernity.  According  to  Oliverio,  the  quest  for  community  (Jackson
Wilson, 1968) is not disconnected from the quest for a new individualism. Whilst the
longing for community both in America and in Europe usually went hand-in-hand with
a vigorous denunciation of individualism, in Dewey the reconstruction of individualism
(contrary  to  the  rugged and rapacious  sense  it  had had in  modern times)  and the
reconstruction of community are one and the same undertaking.
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16 Il pensiero di John Dewey tra psicologia, filosofia, pedagogia. Prospettive interdisciplinari is an
anthology  of  particular  interest  especially  because  many  of  its  contributions  offer
original and unorthodox approaches to the thought of John Dewey, testifying to the
theoretical and methodological contribution that his theories still offer in various fields
of  knowledge.  It  also  represents  an  example  of  how profitable  an  interdisciplinary
approach would be faced with the complexities of questions and problems in reference
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